Description

This engaging and important work, written in 1959, is one of the most insightful analyses of the state of play in the Belgian Congo on the eve of its independence (which occurred on May 30, 1960).  It was written by Major (later Major General) Hélio Augusto Esteves Felgas, a Portuguese army officer who was one of the period’s most respected and popular academic authorities on African affairs, while he served as the military commander of the Uíge District of Angola, which bordered the Belgian Congo.

 

Privately published by the author as typescript, in Carmona, Angola (today the city of Uíge), it is predicated upon Felgas’s own extensive first-hand experience, as well as a wide array of scholarly and clandestine sources (Felgas was plugged into a massive spy network).  The work was issued in only a handful of examples (it is one of only 5 known surviving copies today), restricted for circulation to senior Portuguese colonial officials, and would have been implicitly considered ‘Confidential’, as while no Portuguese state secrets are revealed, it contains sensitive information that Lisbon would perhaps prefer not to be discussed publicly.

 

Here Felgas provides a very detailed and balanced analysis of the extremely complex and combustible environment in the Belgian Congo, which would soon explode into one of the era’s most chaotic and high profile diplomatic, political and social disasters.

 

In his Prefacio (pp. 4-7), Felgas notes that the book comes on the heels of his other related publicly-disseminated works, O Congo Belga – Ameaça ou Proteção para a Defense de Angola; Riqueza Hidroelétrica da Africa; As Forcas Armadas do Congo Belga; and A Ocupação militar do Congo Português; however, he notes that “We now present a study on the Belgian Congo, something more developed and specialized than the previous” works.

 

Felgas points out that the Belgian Congo shared a 700 km-plus border with Angola, such that it deserves “our best attention”.  The frontier artificially divided ethnic groups, and the people of the Congo had more loyalty to their own tribe that to either Belgium or Portugal.  Moreover, “the border, as a line of effective separation, is non-existent”, as it is guarded by only a handful of posts, with many people migrating across it every day unnoticed.  In the Belgian Congo, especially in Léopoldville, there are many thousands of migrants from the Portuguese Congo, attracted by “higher wages and better working conditions”.

 

It is remarked that “it is very easy for the Congolese indigenous people of the Belgian Congo to influence our indigenous people” and, as such, Portuguese officials must understand what is going on there as best as possible.

 

Felgas observes that “It also happens that the political evolution of the Belgian Congo has reached a speed that no one would have believed just three years ago”.  The objectives of the present work are to understand what the major indigenous powers intend to do, and how the Belgian colonial authorities will react.

 

In the Introdução (pp. 8-22), Felgas commences by noting that 1958 marked the 50^th anniversary of the establishment of the Belgian Congo as a crown colony, it having been converted from being the Congo Free State, the personal property of the King Léopold II.

 

Curiously, in 1908, 54 out the 137 Belgian members of parliament voted against the state takeover of the Congo, with many preferring to sell the colony to another European power.  Belgium proceeded to make the Congo a crown colony and, in the opinion of Felgas, “developed it in a model way”, making great profits such that many forgot their “initial repudiation”.

 

World War II caused profound upheaval throughout Africa, including in the Belgian Congo.  The Belgian government conducted talks with the various major indigenous stakeholders to agree upon a new arrangement for the country, perhaps being some form of self-rule.  Notably, the influential Belgian Professor Jef van Bilsen, in his pamphlet, Un plan de trente ans pour l’émancipation politique de l’Afrique belge (Brussels, 1956), called for the eventual liberation of the Congo from colonialism, a charge taken up by the Congolese journal Conscience Africaine.

 

However, a leading indigenous group, ABAKO (Alliance des Bakongo), criticized the Bilsen plan for subordinating both Belgium and the Congo to the Belgian king, with Felgas writing that “it can be said that the animosity, the mutual distrust between blacks and whites in the Belgian Congo began after the blunt manifesto of ABAKO, an ethnic association already led by the now famous [Joseph] Kasavubu”.

 

The word ‘autonomy’ in connection to the Congo “only appeared for the first time at the congress of the Belgian Socialist Party, towards the end of 1956”.  The Congolese “accepted’ this term, “starting a series of demands… some of which are unreasonable”.

 

A watershed moment occurred in in 1958, when ABAKO demanded “immediate independence” for the Congo.  Thereafter, “several circumstances contributed to the speed” of the political evolution of the country.  Social issues “appeared prominently” with Belgian politicians admitting that the colonial regime was one of “racism” but “without the rigidity of South African ‘Apartheid’”.  At this time, Congolese leaders were left “feeling confident on the ground”, although the colony’s economy was very vulnerable, as it was entirely dependent on commodity exports, controlled by monopolies.  This system retarded development, the Congo suffered weak investment due to security fears, while most of the indigenous peoples endured poor living conditions.

 

A point not to be underestimated, the period saw the rise of spiritual movements in the Congo, like Kitawala, which called for “Africa for Africans”, and that were naively tolerated by the Belgian colonial authorities.

 

There are major ethnic cleavages within the Belgian Congo, leading the formation of numerous different tribal associations, many of which do not much like each other.  This was a bad omen for Congolese unity.

 

Felgas continues, remarking that ABAKO had the “most pernicious and extremist actions, that forged itself into a political party and even a terrorist sect”.  Yet, the Belgian government behaved with “complacency” towards the tribal associations and religious sects.  It was also naive about the objectives of the professional associations and indigenous labour unions.  The troublesome leaders of the various factions were often given “immunity”, which “encouraged all the Congolese to put aside the old respect for the white people and to forget the…disciplined Belgian colonial plan”.

 

Felgas opines that “the benevolence of the Government of the Belgian Congo was taken for granted.  Furthermore, the Congolese felt left alone throughout Africa, which had become independent or was about to become so, as well as especially their brethren in French Equatorial Africa.”

 

The September 1958 independence referenda in the French African colonies proved to be a major motivator for the Belgian Congolese self-determination movements.  They intended to ask King Baudouin to grant their country its independence when he visited Léopoldville to celebrate the 50^th anniversary of the Belgian Congo.  However, the king declined, while the Belgian prime minister cancelled a planned trip to the colony.

 

Felgas observes that “unrest grew” in the “until recently peaceful Belgian Congo”, as indigenous “demands increased”.  The Belgian colonial authorities introduced reforms and vaguely promised the Congolese that they would be given their independence someday, but this was “not sufficient” for the indigenous leaders.

 

Felgas remarks that “the seriousness of the situation did not go unnoticed by Europeans living in the Congo”, who believed that “danger was up close”, as “the threats of African leaders [in the Congo] even had an identical flavour to the xenophobia unleashed in other European colonies on the Dark Continent”.  A White ‘self-defense’ force was even formed in Katanga, the “region where Belgian interests are greatest”.

 

At this point, the Belgian government did try to push back a bit.  The upcoming Accra Conference (December 1958) was supposed the be the international ‘coming out’ event for the Belgian Congo independence movement, but the Belgians allowed only 3 of the 20 registered attendees to go, a trio which notably excluded an enraged Joseph Kasa-Vubu.

 

At end of 1958, “Léopoldville’s environment was the worst possible”, as one fifth of the population suffered from either vagrancy, illness or unemployment.  These people were stirred up by Kasa-Vubu to mount the Léopoldville Riots (January 4-13, 1959), which left hundreds dead and large parts of the indigenous quarter of the city in flames, while “Europeans everywhere feared for their lives”.

 

On January 13, 1959, King Baudouin made a Declaration that conceded that the Belgian Congo should become independent; however, he was vague on the timing and terms.  This move backfired, as the Belgians came across as weak, such that the Congolese indigenous leaders smelled blood, and “they would no longer retreat”.

 

The Belgian prime minister visited the Congo on a listening tour with major indigenous and European stakeholders.  He returned the Brussels “convinced that the Congo, as a Belgian colony, had its days numbered”, a point of view that soon came to be shared throughout the Belgian firmament.

 

However, “the tension was far from abating”, as a curfew was imposed in Léopoldville, and in the Lower Congo, where the unemployed and dispossessed instigated multiple riots that “threw the entire region into disarray”.  Only the arrival fresh troops from Belgium quieted the Lower Congo, while the curfew remained in the capital until March.

 

Belgium then moved to speed up the process towards Congolese independence.  Wage rises were enacted, anti-racism laws were passed and the headquarters of many companies that primarily operated in the colony were transferred from Belgium to the Congo.

 

The First Consultative College was called, which elevated many Congolese figures to senior government positions, while large sums were given by the Belgian government to shore up the Congo’s beleaguered public balance sheet.  Moreover, huge Belgian and international investments were made in agrarian production and infrastructure.

 

Felgas writes that “There was no doubt in everyone’s mind that the Belgian Congo had definitely given in, although it did so in a way that was internationally considered to be very honourable”.  Amazingly, the Belgian government was praised by many African leaders and it wanted to be seen as acting in “good faith in giving the Congolese everything they asked for”.

 

The Belgian colonial authorities released the ABAKO leaders who had been arrested for starting the Léopoldville Riots and brought the heads of the various Congolese independence groups to Brussels as the honoured guests of the Belgian state, to conduct negotiations.

 

Felgas remarks that “it seems that so much clemency and good faith on the part of the Belgians should leave the Congolese satisfied because not only do they have their independence guaranteed, but everything is being done so that their independence is built upon a political, social and economic structure as strong as possible.  This structure, however, required time to establish itself, it therefore requires evolution and not precipitation”.

 

It is observed that “now the current Congolese leaders want the be the ones who pass into History. Therefore, delay does not please them”.  They want to be the next Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana or Ahmed Sékou Touré of Guinea, regardless of the consequences.  Felgas writes that “It seems it natural to us that the vanity and precipitation of the Congolese leaders are intent on leading the country to independence in a very short time – Even if this leads to new and even more violent riots”.  Indeed, “nothing can be predicted” in the wake of the “aggressive speeches performed by the likes of Lumumba and Ngalulu, who only a few months ago were considered moderate…the fever took hold of them… it will [likewise] take possession of the Congolese people”.

 

The Belgian government agreed to convene a meeting of all the interested parties in Luluabourg (Kananga) in January 1961, supposedly for the purpose of declaring Congo’s independence.

 

Felgas remarks that “To many people, this resolution will seem impossible to become a reality in such a short period of time.  To us, however, who have been studying the political evolution taking place in all the former European colonies in Africa and Asia, it does not seem so unrealizable”.

 

The main body of the work fills out the themes articulated within the Introduction.

The ‘Parte Primera’ features the chapters: 1 – Problemas fundamentais do Congo Belga [Fundamental Problems of the Belgian Congo] (pp. 27-36); II – A Situação económico-financeira [The Economic and Financial Situation] (pp. 39-46); III – As seitas Religiosas [Religious Sects] (pp. 49-53); IV – Os antagonismos étnicos [Ethnic Antagonisms] (pp. 57-69); and V. Os partidos políticos [The Political Parties] (pp. 73-80).

 

The ‘Parte Segunda’: O futuro politico do Congo Belgo, contains the chapters I – Política e ideias belgas [Belgian Politics and Ideas] (pp. 87-96); II- As reformas política introduzidas em 1958 [The Political Reforms Requested in 1958] (pp. 99-104); III – As crescentes exigências do Congoleses [The Growing Demands of the Congolese] (pp. 107-25); IV – Os tumultos de Janeiro de 1959 [The Riots of January 1959] (pp. 128-32); and V – A democratização do Congo Belga [The Democratization of the Belgian Congo] (pp. 136-52).

 

The Annexes at the end of the work include I. Associações, federações e partidos políticos congoleses [List of Congolese Associations, Federations and Political Parties] (pp. 155-6), incuding around two dozen entries.  Annex II. Programas dos diversos partidos [Description of the Programs of the Various Parties] (pp. 157-72), details the manifestos of 12 major parties, spanning the political spectrum and dominated by many different ethnic groups, being the Alliance des Bakongo (ABAKO), Mouvement National Congolaise (MNC), led by the leftist Patrice Lumumba; Union Progressive Congolaise (UPC) ; Partie Union Congolaise (PUC), Union Katangaise (UK), Partie Socialiste Congolaise (PSC), Parte Démocratique Congolaise (PSA) ; Union Congolaise de Léopoldville ; Partie de Solidarité Africaine (PSA); Mouvement Pour la Progresse National Congolaise (MPNC); Mouvement Pour le Rassemblement des Peuples Congolaises (MRPC) ; and the Partie de Unité Congolaise (also PUC).

 

Annex III. Relação nominal dos principais leaders congoleses [Nominal List of the Main Congolese Leaders] (pp. 173-9) lists dozens of key players in the country, including party leaders like Patrice Lumumba and Joseph Kasa-Vubu, etc.; the heads of professional federations; union bosses; editors of the major newspapers; indigenous mayors; and regional leaders, etc.

 

Annex IV. Alguns dados curiosos [Some Curious Data] (pp. 181-3) features interesting statistics on the country, for example, the Belgian Congo had more the 200 ethnic groups; 400,000 people listened to the radio daily, while 7,000 people in Léopoldville read the newspaper; Belgian Congo’s public debt rose from 3.7 million Belgian Francs in 1950 to 37.4 in 1958; only 43 companies control almost the entire Congolese economy; the daily minimum wage in Léopoldville was 40.7 Belgian Francs, that while not great, was had risen by 120% since 1950 and wass the highest in Central Africa.  Annex V. Indicação dos principais jornais, livros e revistas consultadas para o presente trabalho [Indication of the Main Newspapers, Books and Magazines Consulted for this Work] (pp. 185-6), features a bibliography of ephemeral works.

 

Notably, the text is illustrated by two maps, the first of which is the Divisão administrativa do actual Congo Belga (21 x 20 cm, placed between pp. 36 – 37), printed on tracing paper, it shows the administrative divisions of the Belgian Congo, along with the railway lines.  The second map is the Baixo e Medio Congo Belga (14 x 17.5 cm, placed between pp. 129 -130), which depicts the Lower and Middle Belgian Congo.

 

The present example of the work possesses a fine provenance, coming from the library of Dr. Vasco Marinho Falcão Nunes da Ponte, the Visconde de Roriz, the incumbent Governor of the Moçâmedes District of Angola (in office, 1956-60), a highly influential figure in the Portuguese colonial firmament, being an intellectual, author and bibliophile.  The title bears Felgas’s manuscript dedication to Falcão Nunes da Ponte, “Ao Ex[celsíssimo] Sr. Dr. Vasco Marinho Falcão Nunes da Ponte, c[on] sincera amizade Esteves Felgas 1959”.  

 

Epilogue

 

Under intense pressure from the Congolese indigenous parties, Belgium accelerated its intended timetable, granting its colony full independence on May 30, 1960, creating a country known as the République du Congo, confusingly with the same name as its neighbour, the former French Congo, such that it was popularly known as “Congo-Léopoldville”, while the other was known as “Congo-Brazzaville”.

 

Followong the country’s first elections, Joseph Kasa-Vubu was elected president, while Patrice Lumumba, the leftist head of the Mouvement national Congolais (MNC), was chosen to be prime minister.  However, the county’s political system began to collapse almost as soon as it was established, in part due to the competing ambitions of its leaders, and part due the mendacious meddling of Belgium and various world powers in the context of the Cold War.  Basically, Kasa-Vubu and Lumumba despised each other, while the Western powers distrusted Lumumba due to his ties to Moscow.  To make matters worse, less than two weeks after Congo-Léopoldville declared its independence, the mineral rich province of Katanga declared its desire to secede, with the thinly veiled support of support of Belgium (who hoped to retain control of its mines).  Soon Lumumba and Kasa-Vubu came into open conflict, causing a constitutional crisis.

 

On January 17, 1961, Colonel Joseph-Désiré Mobuto removed Lumumba from power, whereupon he was turned over to be murdered by Belgian-backed Katangan separatists.  Mobutu, now known as Mobutu Sese Seko deposed Kasa-Vibu in 1965, making himself the president-dictator.  He presided over an ultra-kleptocratic and extremely oppressive regime until he was deposed in 1997.

 

The unrest in the Congo soon spilled over into Angola (as Felgas had feared).  In what became known locally as the Angolan War of Independence (1961-74), the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA), an armed rebel movement led by Holden Roberto, took up arms against Portuguese rule.  The FNLA had a conservative Christian ideological bent, and was dominated by the Bakongo people, who lived in far northern Angola.  The movement originally hoped to overthrow the Portuguese regime in northern Angola and to re-establish the Kingdom of Kongo, a former Bakongo-ruled mega-state that lasted from around 1390 until 1862, controlling northern Angola and much of today’s Democratic Republic of the Congo.  The FNLA would be actively supported by Mobutu Sese Seko.

 

Hélio Esteves Felgas: Soldier-Scholar during the Twilight of Colonialism

 

Hélio Augusto Esteves Felgas (1920 – 2008) was one of the great soldier-scholars of African affairs of the Decolonization / Cold War era, publishing numerous influential studies on the societies, politics and military sciences of Angola and the Belgian Congo, as well as being one of Portugal most decorated frontline battle commanders.

 

He was inarguably brilliant and intellectually honest, never being afraid of expressing controversial opinions, which were always taken seriously by friend and foe alike.

 

He graduated from military college as lieutenant of infantry in 1941, and continued his training, passing the High Command Course (IAEM) and completing advanced studies colonial history, English and Russian.  During his early career, he was posted to Mozambique and East Timor, before serving in Angola for most of the 1950s.  Promoted to Major, he became the army commander of the Uíge District of northern Angola, whereupon he focused upon studying the relationship between Angola and the Belgian Congo.

 

Beginning in the early 1950s, Felgas began to publish innumerable academic articles and books.  He possessed an uncommonly brilliant mind that easily equalled that of top-flight professors, which combined with his extensive experience in the field and access to clandestine intelligence, allowed his work to attain an unparalleled level of insight and accuracy.

 

Since 1947, he served on the editorial board of the prestigious periodical, Revista militar, and over his long career he wrote 85 academic articles.

 

His numerous books included, Timor português (Lisbon, 1956); História do Congo Português (Carmona, 1958); Ocupação militar do Congo Português (Lisbon, 1958); A riqueza hidroeléctrica da África: alguns aspectos económicos, políticos, sociais e militares do seu aproveitamento (Lisbon, 1959); As populações nativas do Congo português (Luanda, 1960); A revolta militar no Congo (Lisbon, 1960); Guerra em Angola (Lisbon, 1961);

A importância militar dos novos Estados Africanos (Lisbon, 1964); A África entre as duas Chinas (Lisbon, 1965); and Guerra na Guiné (Lisbon, 1967).  Many of his books had surprisingly high readership for such intellectually weighty tomes.

 

During the Guerra do Ultramar (the Portuguese African wars of independence), Felgas, who was promoted to Colonel in 1961, served two tours (1963-4 and 1968-9) as a senior frontline battle commander in Guiné (Guiné-Bissau), the ‘meatgrinder’ that was by far and away the most brutal theatre of the conflict.  During latter tour, he was the Head of the General Staff of Eastern Guiné, successfully leading the difficult Op Lance Afiada.

 

Towards the end of his tenure in Guiné, he severely criticized the Portuguese government and its military leadership for allowing the conflict there to become Portugal’s “Vietnam”.  While such outspokenness would lead most officers into trouble, Felgas was so highly respected that he remained unscathed (it also helped that his criticisms were accurate).  He became one of the most highly decorated solders in the Portuguese army due to his valour and skill, retiring with the rank of Major General.

 

A Note on Rarity

 

The present work is extremely rare, as only a handful of examples were made for private circulation amongst the Portuguese colonial elite; there is no evidence that the work was ever sold or publicly disseminated.

 

We can trace 4 institutional examples of the work, held by the University of California-Los Angeles; the University of Syracuse; the Belisário Pimenta Collection at the University of Coimbra; and the Biblioteca Adriano Moreira (Bragança).  Moreover, we are not aware of any records of the work as ever having appeared on the market.

 

References: University of California – Los Angeles: DT657.2 .F354 1959; University of Syracuse: DT657.2 .F354 1959; Biblioteca Adriano Moreira (Bragança): CDU 32FEL; OCLC: 17540635; BIBLIOTECA DA UNIVERSIDADE DE COIMBRA, Bibliografia de Belisário Pimenta (Coimbra, 1974), no. 514 (p. 94); Luís Filipe de OLIVEIRA E CASTRO, A nova Africa ensaio sociopolítico (Lisbon, 1967), p. 147.