Description

In the wake of the British conquest of Jerusalem, in December 1917, the command of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF), the British army in the Levant, has to make difficult choices as to how to move forward, with the ultimate aim of taking Damascus, the Ottoman-German headquarters in the region.  The problem was that fighting north form Jerusalem through Palestine was considered to be prohibitively difficult.  So, the EEF command considered an alternative, taking Transjordan, and then using it a base to strike Damascus’s ‘soft underbelly’.  Such an operation, if successful, would also sever the Hejaz Railway, the Ottomans’ only link to Arabia and Red Sea.

The problem was that the terrain between Jerusalem and the main centres in Transjordan, being Amman and Al-Salt, was extreme.  From Jerusalem one had to descend the Judean Hills to near where the Jordan River met the Dead Sea, around 400 meters below sea level, before having to ascend over 1,000 metres above sea level to attack Amman and Al-Salt, with innumerable mountains and wadis in between.

Initially, the British relied on outdated and vague cartography of the Transjordan, predicated upon George Armstrong’s map, Palestine, from the Surveys Conducted for The Committee of the Palestine Exploration Fund and Other Sources … revised by Colonel Sir Charles W. Wilson … and Major C.R. Conder (London: Edward Stanford for the Palestine Exploration Fund, 1890).

The base of the present work was printed in Cairo by the Survey of Egypt in February 1918 and is largely derived from Armstrong’s 28-year old map.  To a large scale of 1 mile to an inch, it depicts the vital portion of the Transjordan the extended from the Dead Sea and the lower Jordan valley, in the west, over to Al-Salt and Na’ur (just to the west of Amman) and then down south as far as Madaba.  This encompassed the crucial battle zone that the British would have to traverse in order to conquer the nucleus of Transjordan.

As the British prepared to invade Transjordan, they charged the Royal Air Corps with conducting reconnaissance mapping flights over the region, launched from aerodromes in Palestine.  Such aerial mapping played a major role in World War I, dramatically improving the quality of maps in areas where scientific surveying on the ground was not possible.  However, these missions were extremely dangerous, as the planes had to fly at low altitudes in order to properly photograph the terrain, exposing them to enemy fire.  Moreover, aircraft of the period were subject to frequent technical problems, causing many plane crashes, and situations where the pilot-cartographers were forced to land in enemy territory.

The present map features extensive corrections and additions overprinted in indigo, pursuant to information from photographs taken by the Australian Squadron of the Royal Air Corps.  These augmentations were added by the Field Survey Company at the Egyptian Expeditionary Force’s headquarters in Jerusalem on March 11, 1918, as noted by the indigo line below the imprint, in the lower-left margin, which reads ‘Field Survey Co.y, R.E. G.H.Q. E.E.F. / 11^th March 1918’

The note in the lower-left margin describes the significance of the indigo overprint:

‘Note. The detail overprinted in purple is compiled from aeroplane photographs taken by the R.F.C.  The detail between the Jordan and M central is based on the old Map. The remaining detail is fitted on to the position of Kefr Huda which has been fixed trigonometrically. Roads shown thus — are from agents reports.’

The aerial photographers abord the Australian planes used Kefr Huda, just to the northwest of ‘Es Salt’, as a base point for the rest of the corrections, as its geodetic location could be precisely ascertained.  The indigo corrections reveal major errors in the underlying cartography, correcting the locations of Al-Salt, the course of the Jordan River, as well as the routes of numerous wadis.  Additionally, the area’s major roads are noted, distinguishing whether or not they are fit for wheeled vehicles.  This information would prove vitally useful to the British forces as they enacted their plans.

The British commenced what became known as the First Transjordan Attack on Amman (March 18, 1918) only a week after the indigo corrections were added to the present work, ensuring that this map would have been the authoritative guide used by the expedition’s commanders.

While the British successfully navigated their way across the Jordan and up the wadis and mountains to take Al-Salt (in good part due to the present map!), the mission ultimately failed to overcome the Ottoman-German’s heavily defended positions at Amman.

 

A Note on Editions and Rarity

The present map, dated February 1918, represents the first (of 3) known editions of the map; we cannot trace even a reference to this edition let alone the location of any other examples.  The second edition, printed with the date of April 22, 1918, updates the map with information from the indigo corrections upon the first edition; we can find only a single example held by the National Library of Australia, which features further overprinting in indigo.  A third edition was issued with the date of May 15, 1918; we can trace only 2 institutional examples, held by the National Archives U.K. and the National Library of Israel.

All editions of map are very to extremely rare, as they would have been issued in only a handful of examples for the classified use of frontline commanders, while the survival rate of such field maps is very low.

 

The First British Invasion of the Transjordan

During the first two years or so of World War I in Egypt and the Levant, the Ottoman-German side was on the offensive; however, the British Imperial forces turned the tables, entering Ottoman territory in Palestine in January 1917.  While the going in Palestine was tough, the British famously took Jerusalem on December 11, 1917.  While this event had immense symbolic significance, it was far from being strategically advantageous.  Jerusalem lay to south of heavily defended mountainous country.  To the east, beyond the Jordan Valley and the Dead Sea, lay the highlands of Trans-Jordan, a treacherous terrain of steep hills and deep, irregularly shaped wadis, in places rising as much as 2,000 metres above the Jordan River.  This posed an immense challenge to any army on the move, especially a force on the offensive in enemy territory.

Pushing north from Jerusalem promised to be (and indeed proved to be) incredibly difficult.  As such, General Edmund Allenby, the supreme commander of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, decided that invading Transjordan might be a good alternative.  The objectives of the mission would be to cross the Jordan River, and ascend the highlands to take the key city of Amman and the important garrison town of Al-Salt, while severing the Hejaz Railway.  This railroad, which ran from Damascus (the headquarters of the Central Powers forces in the Middle East) to Medina, and while the route was often temporarily interrupted in places by enemy action, it represented the Ottoman-German sides’ one link to Arabia and the Red Sea.  Moreover, it was hoped that the conquest of Amman would expose the ‘soft underbelly’ of Damascus.

In February 1917, the British moved to take the Jordan Valley, seizing Jericho on February 19-21, 1918, and securing the western bank of the river above the Dead Sea by winning the Battle of Tell’Asur (March 2-12, 1918).

Their imperfect knowledge of the landscape across the Jordan River was a major concern to British commanders, so it was at this juncture that they dispatched the Royal Flying Corps to make several reconnaissance flights over the Transjordan, seeking to gain an accurate picture, resulting in the indigo corrections upon the present map.

On March 18, 1918, the British proceeded to cross the Jordan, with was only accomplished with great difficultly, as the initial parties were subject to heavy Ottoman fire.  However, the bridgeheads were eventually secured and pontoon bridges at El Ghorhaniye and Makahadet were constructed across the fast-flowing river.

Led by General John Shea, the British expedition consisted of the 60^th (London) Division of the British Army, the ANZAC Mounted Division, and the Imperial Camel Crops Brigade.  They were set to face a force that consisted of 4-5,000 Ottoman troops, who were well-entrenched in Amman, and another 2,000 men posted at Al-Salt.

After the crossing, Shea’s main force roughly followed the main road (as marked by the intermittent lines on the present map) from El Gorhaniya towards Al-Salt.  Although this route was only 24 km, it required an ascent of 1,200 metres up the plateau that was home to Al-Salt and Amman.  The going was very difficult, and some of the British forces had to follow challenging local paths off the main route to progress, yet the British were able to take Al-Salt on May 25, 1918.

The British forces then moved quickly towards Amman, which was 29 km to the southeast over very difficult terrain, in what proved to be bad weather.  The British divided their army, with one group taking up position at Ain el Sir, 9.2 north-northwest of Amman, while another made it south to Na’ur, today a western suburb of Amman.  The terrain was so rough, and the roads were in such bad condition, that wheeled vehicles need to be abandoned, forcing the British to make progress by either foot or by camel, in unfavourable conditions.

The British attack, which came to be known as the First Battle of Amman (March 27-31, 1918), was repelled.  The fighting was brutal and the British took 1,400 casualties, as the Ottoman-Germans were well armed and their positions strongly dug in.  Shea realized that Amman was impregnable and on March 31 ordered a retreat towards the Jordan, with the Central Powers in pursuit.

The British spent a horrific ten days making their way down to the Jordan River through driving rain, fending off constant Ottoman attacks.  Shea’s force crossed the Jordan back into Palestine on April 2, leaving the bridgeheads across to the river in British hands.

The first British invasion of Transjordan was a disaster, costing many men and the loss of much equipment.  It represented the first British defeat in the Levant since the Second Battle of Gaza, in April 1917.  A postmortem of the event confirmed that the British invasion force was too small to match the Ottoman-German defenses at Amman, while mounting such an endeavour during the rainy season was seen as a mistake.

Nevertheless, the EEF command still believed that forcing their way through Transjordan was a less bad option that pressing north from Jerusalem into the hills.  The British mounted a Second Invasion of Transjordan (April 30 – May 4, 1918), that while better prepared and featuring a larger force, was defeated in a similar fashion by Ottoman-German army, which had been strengthened upon the arrival of additional troops from Damascus, traveling along the Hejaz Railway.

The failure of both of the invasions of Transjordan convinced the British to try their luck with pressing north of Jerusalem in Palestine.

This resulted in a brutal, slow campaign that only after months made decisive progress at the Battle of Megiddo (September 19.25, 1918), or the ‘Breakthrough at Nablus’.  There the British routed the Ottoman-German forces, opening the way to Damascus, which was taken on October 1, 1918, prefiguring the total Entente victory in the Levant at the end of the month.

 

References: N/A – No examples of the present first edition recorded. Cf. (Second ed.:) NLA: GSGS 4002. 1916; (3rd ed.:) NA: WO 303/314; National Library of Israel: Laor Map Collection Jordan 7.